throughout the contract duration. Next, note that the adjoint equation for the co-state variable μ(t) is = constant oe t.
Thus μ must take the same value throughout the contract duration. If μ > 1, then > 0 implying that w must be the maximum possible and ∂ ∂ H w hence the optimal value of w > w IR , since the domain of the wage premium w is R + . However, such a choice of w results in a smaller net value for the firm than if the firm chose w = w IR since paying wages is a cost to the firm and has no impact on programmer productivity. This is a contradiction because a suboptimal value of w gives a better solution to the firm. Hence it must be that μ # 1. If μ < 1, then .
On the other hand, if μ = 1, then can take any possible positive value (singular solution).
Proof of Lemma 2
We represent by z. Thus, using Equation 4, we can write
Next, taking the derivative of both sides of Equation 4 with respect to t, we have 
Equating the values of λ from equations 6 and 7, we obtain
Note that the coefficient of z as well as the term independent of z are purely functions of x and and are independent of the controls or t. Hence, we represent these two terms by -g(x,t) and h(x,t), respectively. Now suppose that z = 0 at two different instants τ 0 and τ 1 , where τ 0 < τ 1 , without loss of generality. We consider an instant t such that τ 0 < t < τ 1 and z(t) … 0. The general solution of the differential equation 8 is
where C is the constant of integration. Using this equation we can write the solution between t and τ 1 as 
From equations 9 and 10, we note that z(t) must have two different values at t. However, equation 8 implies that z(t) must be a continuous function. Hence, it cannot have two values at any point. Hence our supposition that z = 0 at two non-contiguous instants must be incorrect. Since z is continuous in t, it can be either positive of negative prior to and after when it becomes zero. If z > 0, v = 1 and if z < 0, v = 0. This gives us the statement of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1
Statement A of the proposition follows from Lemma 2.
For Statement B, note that = 0 and = 0 are required for a singular solution since the partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect
to the control must be zero and must continue to remain to be zero for some interval. Also, is the standard adjoint condition. These
three equations simplify to the following:
Simultaneously solving equations 11 and 12 we obtain the solutions for x and λ, whereupon we can find . Substituting in values of λ, , and
, we obtain the value of v for the singular solution.
For Statement C, note that for μ = 0, the IR constraint is not binding. Further, λ(T) = 0 since the firm does not have a salvage value of programmer skills. From Equation (4) 2 that and . By Lemma 2, it must be that z(t) has the same sign in the interval 0
to . Accordingly, it is sufficient to check if . If that is true then v = 1 and if not then v = 0. cially depends upon the value of λ at (i.e., ). Also note that λ must be equal to 0 at t = T since the firm has no salvage value for t t =  λ the skills of the programmer at t = T. If > 0 or if < -aμ0, then this is impossible (since then λ either monotonically increases from λ λ a positive value or monotonically decreases from a negative value). However this may be possible when < 0 and + aμ > 0 (now λ λ λ can increase monotonically from a negative value and reach zero). It is easy to verify that the second condition always holds under requirements imposed on the parameters c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , and c 4 . The first condition requires . Note 
to our restriction on marginal productivity of programmers. Hence, v = 1 cannot be a solution in this region when the IR constraint is binding.
Hence, v = 0, the only remaining possibility is the solution.
Proof of Proposition 2
The general solution to equation 5 is , where C is the constant of integration. Using x = x 0 at t = 0 we obtain C. This expression is independent of μ. Hence it is applicable irrespective of whether the IR constraint is binding or not.
From Lemma 3, we know that . Now we write the differential equation for λ in this region. Using the adjoint equation,
The general solution for this equation is , where C is the constant of integration and t is transformed to the scale 
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a situation where the IR constraint binds but the firm does not pay any wage premium to the programmer (w = 0). In this situation, it must be that ax(T) = M 0 . Using equation 5 and the boundary conditions at t = 0 and at , and using the fact that v = 0
in between and T, we find an expression for .
